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ABSTRACT  
 
Many asylum seekers and refugees in South Africa reportedly find it difficult to 
access basic health care services. The issue about foreign nationals in relation to 
health care can be considered from different angles. The concept of access, though, 
points to gate-keeping. Gate-keeping is the practice that guides decision making 
about who has access to what and to what extent they might enjoy benefits. In this 
essay, the question of whether gate-keeping is a morally justifiable practice in South 
Africa in relation to asylum seekers and refugees’ right to basic health care services 
is explored.  It is concluded that carefully considered and consistently implemented 
gate-keeping might be a morally justifiable practice that could contribute to ensuring 
that resources are distributed fairly. It is also argued that the kind of gate-keeping 
often observed is inconsistent with human rights and Ubuntu precepts. These moral 
frameworks seem to be the main ones shaping the view of most South Africans as 
well as our institutional arrangements. Considering the current South African context 
in which asylum seekers and refugees have difficulty in accessing basic health care 
services, patriotic bias claims are considered. However, it is concluded that partiality 
towards compatriots ought not to hold sway when any human being’s basic needs 
are at stake.            
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1. Introduction 
 
At the time of writing this research essay the ‘refugee crisis’ draws much attention in 
different parts of the world. Including war conditions, political instability, dire 
economic conditions and factionalism, peoples from Syria, Pakistan, Somalia, 
Nigeria and many more leave their homelands in search of safety and a better future.  
Perceivably more affluent countries, Western countries in particular, are sought out 
by migrants. The magnitude of the inflow of migrants in countries calls to account 
(willing and unwilling) host countries’ ideology and practical implementation 
concerning human rights matters. These challenges span emotions evoked by, for 
instance, the photograph of the lifeless body of three year old Aylan Kurdi, from 
Syria, who drowned as his family tried to reach Europe by boat1, or the outrage 
following sexual attacks on German women in December 2015 by immunity-claiming 
migrants2. Host countries are compelled to examine their stance on international 
relations with states from which migrants flee. They also need to make decisions 
about the distribution of resources, customarily reserved for their own citizens, to 
large numbers of foreigners. Questions such as ‘how much of what is ours are we 
prepared to share?’ and ‘what is our responsibility towards uninvited others who 
make our country their home?’ become apparent in the choices made by those in 
government and reflect in the sentiments of citizens.     
        
                                                          
1
 Helena Smith, “Shocking images of drowned Syrian boy show tragic plight of refugees”, The Guardian, 2 
September 2015. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/02/shocking-image-of-drowned-
syrian-boy-shows-tragic-plight-of-refugees   
2
 Damine McGuinnes, “Germany shocked by Cologne New Year gang assaults on women”, BBC News, 5 January 
2016. Available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35231046 
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Similarly, South Africa has, and continues to, become the destination of citizens from 
a variety of other African countries. The narratives of many individuals and families 
migrating to South Africa highlight the horror of factional fighting in some African 
countries and gross human rights violations perpetrated in politically and 
economically unstable circumstances. Some of the affected individuals and families 
make their way to South Africa for refuge and in hope of a better future3.   
 
The South African Government has a policy of integration in regard to non-nationals4 
and the South African Constitution5 encapsulates the spirit of respect for the dignity 
of each human being. However, persons from other African countries do not 
necessarily experience South Africa as a place where their dignity and basic human 
rights are acknowledged, despite the South African Government’s policy of 
integration6. Brutal examples, as quoted in the media in 2000, are South African 
Police officers setting dogs on migrant men7, and the stabbing (19 April 2015) of 
Emmanuel Sithole from Mozambique in Alexandra during a time of heightened 
xenophobic violence8.  
 
A particular aspect of asylum seeker and refugee experience in South Africa is the 
focus of this essay and that is their apparent difficulty in accessing basic health care.  
                                                          
3
 Roderick Mupedziswa, “’All That Glitters Is Not Gold’: Johannesburg and Migrant Access to Social Services”, In 
Quality of Life and the Millennium Challenge, eds. V. Møller and D. Huschka (Springer Science & Business 
Media 2009): pp.139-158, p.139.   
4
 Ndumiso Ntshinga, “Statement by South Africa on recent attacks on foreign nationals in South Africa and 
prevention measures for the future”, 30 April 2015. Available at:  
http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2015/ntsh0430.htm 
5
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa. Act 200 of 1993. 
6
 Ntshinga, “Statement by South Africa on recent attacks on foreign nationals in South Africa and prevention 
measures for the future”. 
7
 Jonathan Crush, “The Dark Side of Democracy: Migration, Xenophobia and Human Rights in South Africa”, 
International Migration 38/6 (2000): pp.103-133, p103. 
8
 Beauregard Tromp and James Oatway, “The brutal death of Emmanuel Sithole”, Sunday Times, 19 April 2015. 
Available at: http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2015/04/19/the-brutal-death-of-emmanuel-sithole1 
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In South Africa this happens despite our permissive constitutional undertakings as 
well as the Refugees Act 130 of 1998 directive that a refugee “is entitled to the same 
health services … which inhabitants of the Republic receive from time to time”9. 
 
The situation appears to have many sides. On the one hand, there may be a self-
protective sentiment, described by Jonathan Crush as “… a citizenry that feels under 
siege from the outside”10. On the other hand, some government department 
practices and/or internal regulations11 appear to be in conflict with the South African 
Constitution and the Refugees Act. As a result, refugees and asylum seekers might 
claim services, for instance at a public hospital, but be denied such services due to a 
departmental instruction, for example, to pay fees because of their non-national 
status in order to receive treatment12. In these instances, the practice of gate-
keeping becomes pertinent.  
 
The focus of this essay is to explore the ethical implications of the role of gate-
keeping in relation to refugee and asylum seeker need for basic health care in South 
Africa. The plight of undocumented migrants is perceivably as dire, if not more so, 
concerning access to basic health care. However, the scope of the essay is 
narrowed down to foreigners who are recognised by South African laws. Limiting the 
scope in this way is not intended to negate the needs of probably one of the most 
vulnerable groups in our society – those who have no standing in accessing any kind 
of service, who do not legally ‘exist’. 
                                                          
9
 Refugees Act 130 of 1998. Chapter 5(g). Available at: http://www.saflii.org/za/legis/consol_act/ra199899.pdf 
10
 Crush, “The Dark Side of Democracy: Migration, Xenophobia and Human Rights in South Africa”, p.110. 
11
 Jo Vearey and Marlise Richter, “Challenges to the successful implementation of policy to protect the right of 
access to health for all in South Africa”, Report on behalf of Migrant Health Forum (3 June 2008): p.6.  Available 
at: http://cormsa.org.za/wp-content/uploads/Research/Access/MigrantGautengDoH.pdf 
12
 Ibid., p.6.  
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Moreover, it could rightfully be argued that South African citizens face the same kind 
of obstacles in accessing basic health care as do many refugees and asylum 
seekers. The struggle of many South African citizens who are still, from a living 
conditions perspective, arguably no better off than prior to 1994 is recognised and 
considered as important a field of study. However, considering the span of this 
essay, the focus will be limited to asylum seekers and refugees.        
 
2. Essay question and its relevance 
 
Even though moral unease exists about the impact of gate-keeping on the dignity of 
asylum seekers and refugees in South Africa, particularly by those who work in the 
Non-Governmental Organisation sector and are dedicated to promote human rights 
awareness, sufficient ethical enquiry in a more formal sense appears to be lacking.  
The importance of exploring the question of whether gate-keeping is a morally 
justifiable practice in South Africa in relation to refugee and asylum seeker rights to 
basic health care is to bring into focus both the potentially legitimate role as well as 
the possibly unjustifiable nature of some forms of gate-keeping. Whilst the ethical 
deliberation in this report is of an academic nature, the need to explore the issue is 
important because of the stories of many individuals who seem to be adversely 
affected as a result of arguably unjustifiable gate-keeping in the health care sector.  
Yvette Mbayo-Ndaya’s story alludes to this. 
 
It is lunchtime in the bustling neighbourhood of Malvern in downtown 
Johannesburg. On a main street lined with shops a man stops in his tracks.  
He picks up several lollipops from a make-shift stall in front of one of the 
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shops and gives the money to the vendor, a tired-looking woman who moves 
slowly, dragging her feet with every step. 
“I am sick,” says Yvette Mbayo-Ndaya. I have high blood pressure. I have 
diabetes. I have kidney failure.” …  “I get my high blood and diabetes 
treatment from the Johannesburg hospital [Charlotte Maxeke]. But for the 
kidney they never give me medication. They say ‘there is no medication for 
foreigners’13.  
 
The story of Yvette Mbayo-Ndaya, a migrant from the DRC14, echoes the narratives 
of many foreign nationals who try to access health care services in South Africa. A 
variety of obstacles seem to be experienced. These include institutional directives 
that obstruct access to health care services, a blank refusal of services without any 
explanation given, a shouting down in the clinic reception area by the official calling a 
person a makwerekwere – derogatory term for an “African foreign national”15 - 
needing to go back to where she came from, or perhaps an official demanding an 
‘unofficial’ fee which presumably goes to their own pocket. Such stories illustrate 
disregard for the spirit of our Constitution that advocates respect of every person’s 
basic human rights, the Ubuntu principles of acknowledging the dignity of persons, 
as well as the Refugees Act instructing access to basic health care. Ethical enquiry 
to prompt awareness, debate and, hopefully, a deeper understanding of the 
variables at play, seems to be called for.       
 
                                                          
13
 M & G Centre for Health Journalism, Bhekisisa, “SA is no haven for sick refugees”, Mail and Guardian, May 
13 to 19 2016.  
14
 Ibid. 
15 David Mario Matsinhe, “Africa’s Fear of Itself: the ideology of Makwerewere in South Africa”, Third World 
Quarterly 32/2 (2011): pp. 295-313, p.302. Available at http://www. 
Academia.edu/804853/Africas_fear_of_itself_The _ideology_of_Makwerekwere_in_South Africa 
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The essay question, when contextually placed, requires exploration of four areas 
linked to an area of philosophical literature. The first area is the nature and ethics of 
gate-keeping. Secondly, the concept of human rights, originally stemming from 
Western moral philosophies, needs exploration. Thirdly, in an African context, 
Ubuntu is a framework according to which morality could be defined and will 
therefore be explored in relation to the essay question. The fourth area of inquiry 
concerns patriotic bias, looking at whether it can be ethically justified that South 
Africans are given preference with regards to access to health care services.  
 
Drawing support from these areas of enquiry, it is concluded that gate-keeping can 
be a morally justifiable practice in South Africa in relation to the right of refugees and 
asylum seekers to basic health care. However, gate-keeping is a morally justifiable 
practice, if and only if, the ethics that determine the kind of gate-keeping practiced 
does not deny the dignity and basic human rights of people. Furthermore, it is 
asserted that legitimate patriotic bias is not sufficient, morally speaking, to justify 
reserving health care resources for South African compatriots when basic human 
rights concerns are at stake.    
 
3. Gate-keeping 
 
The practice of gatekeeping seems to be more entrenched in the way humans 
organise themselves than perhaps consciously recognised. Notice, for instance, the 
way young children behave on a school playground, giving access to some to join a 
group of friends and refusing association to others. Other examples include a private 
school for boys where entry is granted with fewer obstacles to those whose fathers 
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are part of the institution’s history and support base, or Muslim, Jewish and Christian 
parents refusing marriage between their child and a person from another religion.  
These examples illustrate intuitive gate-keeping responses in social and cultural 
situations, where explicit or written rules do not necessarily apply, yet where its 
precepts are nevertheless practiced.  
 
The kind of gate-keeping relevant to the essay topic, though, is the sort where it is 
implicit to, or consciously built into, societal, institutional/organisational, and role-
related practice. Refugees and asylum seekers, as a category of people, seek 
access to health care services from a democratic state with a human rights 
constitution. When they indicate that their access to such services is obstructed, 
questions might be raised about the sort of, and rationale for, the gate-keeping 
practiced. Are they denied access to basic health care services because they do not 
have a right to such services, and/or are they refused services because of variables 
on an institutional/organisational level, for instance, scarcity of resources and that 
available resources are reserved for those who might be seen to be more eligible 
based on compatriot status, and/or are they confronted with officials who exercise 
mandated or self-claimed exclusionary powers?    
 
In this essay it is argued that the story of Yvette Mbayo-Ndaya, and others who 
share her experiences, illustrate contradictions in the gate-keeping practices across 
the levels mentioned. On the one hand our human rights Constitution and the laws 
that follow therefrom require our government to more or less open the gates and 
meet the basic health care needs of South African citizens as well as refugees and 
asylum seekers. On the other hand, the institutions where access is sought might 
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close the gates to asylum seekers and refugees. Moreover, an institution’s policy 
might permit access to basic health care, but the official on duty might claim 
discretionary powers and refuse access to some refugees and asylum seekers.  
Ethical questions about what is right, and right to who, under what circumstances 
and at what cost, abound in such discourse. The stance taken in this essay is that, 
as it concerns basic health care services and refugees and asylum seekers, gate-
keeping practices ought to withstand the tests of respect for basic human rights and 
dignity of all persons. This will be argued for more specifically later. So far, however, 
the nature of the kind of gate-keeping relevant to the argument has not been 
examined. This is done in the discussion that follows.    
 
As an immediate reaction, one might not think about gate-keeping in relation to our 
Constitution and that legislation is designed to fulfil gate-keeping functions. 
Therefore, when asked why we have a Constitution, a person might not necessarily 
explain its significance by directly referring to the notion of gate-keeping. Consider 
the following line of thinking: the South African Constitution is a document that 
promotes a human rights ethos in which human dignity is central. As the highest and 
overarching rule of law in South Africa, legislation and those who implement laws 
should reflect respect for human rights16. Following on, consider the underlying gate-
keeping principle in what Pierre de Vos and Warren Freedman say about the Bill of 
Rights:   
When confronted with the question of whether law or conduct is in breach of 
the Bill of Rights, … a court must ask whether the person who has been 
infringed is entitled to the protection provided by the Bill of Rights and whether 
                                                          
16 Pierre de Vos & Warren Freedman, “Introduction”. South African Constitutional Law, eds. Pierre de Vos & 
Warren Freedman (Cape Town: Oxford University Press 2014): pp.3-33, p.26.    
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the person or organisation which wishes to approach the court has standing 
to bring the case. Whilst most of the rights in the Bill of Rights are granted to 
everyone, including non-citizens, some are specifically restricted17.   
 
It seems that the role attributed to the Constitution and laws that follow from such a 
stance is to exercise criteria-based discretion about who has rights and to build in 
the condition that some do not have certain rights in certain instances. This seems to 
indicate a gate-keeping role. It might be argued that the South African Constitution 
was not developed expressly to fulfil a gate-keeping function and this might be so.  
At the same time it appears that such a role is implied in that the Constitution grants 
rights or opens the gate and, in some instances, closes the gates. Perhaps by using 
a historical example the point might be illustrated more strongly. During the years of 
apartheid in South Africa, the laws of our country opened the gates and granted 
rights and opportunities to white South Africans. By the same token, laws kept rights 
and opportunities out of reach of all those who were not considered white South 
Africans. The gate-keeping function of the apartheid laws is clear. Coming back to 
the essay topic, I am suggesting that our Constitution and the ensuing laws serve an 
implicit gate-keeping function.   
 
Following on and moving beyond the abstract sphere of our Constitution and laws, 
gate-keeping is evident on an institutional/organisational level. In the health care 
sector, certain institutions provide services specifically to certain groups of people. 
For example, people living with HIV, diabetes or terminally ill cancer patients who are 
                                                          
17
 Pierre de Vos, “Introduction to an application of the Bill of Rights”. South African Constitutional Law, eds. 
Pierre de Vos & Warren Freedman (Cape Town: Oxford University Press): pp.319-345, pp.319-320.    
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in need of palliative care. In each of these instances criteria are set for those who 
might be granted access and those might not.   
 
Our Constitution and the ensuing laws create a framework that guides the gate-
keeping criteria of institutions, for instance about who should have access to basic 
health care services. There could thus be a justifiable expectation that policy makers 
of departments and institutions of the State ought to design gate-keeping practices 
that reflect what the Constitution stands for. Therefore, if our Constitution and the 
legislation relevant to asylum seekers and refugees grant basic health care rights to 
them, the State departments and institutions should provide these services.   
 
However, moving from the abstract or aspirational, the narratives of persons like 
Yvette Mbayo-Ndaya illustrate that it might be naïve to think that all departments and 
institutions automatically implement the aspirations of our Constitution. One ought 
not to respond with premature judgement, though, about the kind of exclusionary 
gate-keeping practices evident at times. Dilemmas spanning political, economic and 
ethical spheres are plentiful in this arena. For now, however, it is asserted that our 
State departments and institutions ought to follow through with the gate-keeping role 
implied by the principles of our Constitution and relevant legislation. At the very least, 
our institutions ought to reflect recognition of human dignity through the kind of gate-
keeping practices put in place, even when meeting the basic needs of all who are 
needy might be a very difficult or perhaps impossible undertaking.     
 
Turning attention to the gate-keeping function as it plays out more specifically within 
institutions, the role of the individual who exercises the gate-keeping function 
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warrants consideration. Mamadi Corra and David Willer describe gate-keepers as 
those who “control access to ‘benefits’ valued by others who are their ‘clients’” and 
highlight that the gate-keeper does not “own” that which she controls18. As such, “[i]t 
is not the nature of the benefit that determines whether an instance is gatekeeping, 
but its externality to the gate-keeper and the client-gate-keeper relation”19.  
 
Gate-keepers typically fulfil a two-fold role. They firstly decide who has access to 
certain services, benefits or information. Secondly, they exercise judgement in 
determining the extent to which others will be given access to certain services, 
benefits or information20. The power of the gate-keeper thus lies in deciding who has 
access to something as well as the extent of benefit afforded to those who are 
allowed in.  
 
Building on this understanding of what gate-keeping is about, a kind of gate-keeping 
is described by John R. Boatright. The gate-keepers he refers to are third parties 
such as lawyers, accountants and bankers who “use their specialised knowledge 
and skills, as well as their reputation, on behalf of clients”21. Boatright’s assertion is 
“that an intermediary has an obligation, at a minimum, to avoid being complicit in the 
wrongdoing of a client”22. The core issue that Boatright seems to address is that 
intermediaries (gate-keepers), in the third party sense, should take steps to ensure 
that measures are put in place to discourage unethical conduct by any of the role 
                                                          
18
 Mamadi Corra & David Willer, “The Gatekeeper”, Sociological Theory 20/1 (2002): pp.180-207, p.160. 
19
 Ibid., p.180. 
20
 Roger Homan, “The Principle of Assumed Consent: The Ethics of Gatekeeping”, Journal of Philosophy of 
Education 35/3 (2001): pp.329-343, p.332. 
21
 John Boatright, “Reluctant Guardians: The Moral Responsibility of Gatekeepers”, Business Ethics Quarterly 
7/4 (2007): pp.613-632, p.613. 
22
 Ibid., p.614. 
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players23. In some sense the NGO’s who are raising the gate-keeping ethics 
concerning basic health care services by asylum seekers and refugees are fulfilling 
such a third party function, although they do not have formal power within the system 
in the way that Boatright refers to. 
 
In addition to the implicit gate-keeping role of our Constitution and laws, the kind of 
gate-keeping more relevant to the essay discussion concerns the role played by 
those within institutions. They are not third party, but direct role players. Firstly, there 
is the management of health care services, those who write policies and decide how 
individual access to health care services should be directed. Secondly, there are the 
health care service providers, such as doctors and nurses who are expected to fulfil 
their role within the institution’s policies. They are also bound by professional ethics 
that might conflict with the gate-keeping directives of the institution. Thirdly, there is 
the official who might not necessarily be a health care professional, but is mandated 
to follow through with the policy of the organisation. Such a person might, for 
instance, be the administrator at the reception desk who has some control over who 
gets a ‘number’ ticket and may wait in the queue to be called for a consultation.   
   
Cutting across these three potential roles, the gate-keeping function can have 
legitimacy as is illustrated in a discussion by Edmund D Pellegrino. He talks about 
the weighing up of cost and fairness in a system to achieve a balance of interests24. 
Social justice concerns come to the fore in his discussion. He considers the ethics of 
gate-keeping from the point of view that decisions about who has access to what 
                                                          
23
 Ibid., p.629. 
24 Edmund Pellegrino, “Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical Gatekeeping”, Journal of Contemporary 
Health Law & Policy 2/1 (1986): pp.23-45, p.23. Available at:  http://scholarship.law.edu/jchlp/vol2/iss1/6   
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kind of services are motivated by limited health care resources, as is typical of South 
African reality. He points out that gate-keeping by medical doctors might be 
motivated by rules determined by others, for example health care managers. Such 
managers might cap certain services in the light of the expenses involved25.   
 
In the context of the essay discussion, this would refer to the policy makers who 
need to reflect the principles of our human rights Constitution whilst taking into 
account the availability of resources. It might be argued that there are simply not 
enough basic health care resources available to dispense to South African citizens, 
let alone non-citizens. One could imagine the policy makers and management of 
health care services debating this ethical dilemma. Some might say that a shortage 
of basic health care resources in South Africa might justify closing the gates of 
services to some, even though their need for such services is accepted. Others 
might argue that gate-keeping of this sort is contradictory to our Constitutional 
aspirations. Although perhaps not explicitly named as such, the gate-keeping feature 
inherent to discourse of this nature is perceivable.       
     
Narrowing down the focus to the health care service provider, gate-keeping decision 
making involves a mix of interests of self, the patient and service provider/society. 
The health care service provider (Pelligrino talks about the doctor here) needs to 
balance the use of resources so as not to disadvantage the patient or society at 
large.  Criteria applied in this process are whether treatment will likely be “effective” 
and “beneficial”26.  
                                                          
25 Ibid., p.27. 
26
 Ibid., p.26. 
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Diverting from Pellegrino’s discussion, the idea of role-based morality comes to the 
fore here. A basic health care clinic in South Africa might be run on the theoretical 
understanding that access to basic health care services should be granted to South 
African citizens as well as asylum seekers and refugees. However, due to a shortage 
of resources, an internal directive might be followed where preference is given to 
South African citizens rather than non-citizens. The health care worker on duty might 
disregard such a gate-keeping directive on the grounds that any person who arrives 
with a basic health care need should be attended to, regardless of nationality. This is 
the professional duty of a health care worker. In this instance, her role as health care 
worker and incumbent obligations are prioritised. At face value, this seems morally 
right. However, it is not the whole story. This health care worker might be faced with 
100 or 200 other ‘deserving’ patients during her daily shift. Should services, or the 
extent thereof, not be capped according to some gate-keeping rules, a percentage of 
her patients on that day will receive no service at all. The gate-keeping ethical 
dilemmas here are complex and overlap societal, institutional and role-invoked 
considerations.      
        
The third role player talked about earlier is the official who acts as the administrative 
gate-keeping agent of the organisation. Such a person could be expected to carry 
out the directives of the policy makers, perhaps with a defined scope of discretionary 
decision making. Role-related dilemmas applicable to the role of such a person 
might be different from those of the health care service provider in the sense that the 
person will not be making diagnostic or treatment-related decisions. The official 
might nevertheless be confronted with gate-keeping dilemmas. For instance, the 
clinic policy grants certain services to all regardless of nationality. Yet, the official 
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might feel constrained by her knowledge of the shortage of medication in the store 
room and use her discretion as to who to dispense medication to. Conversely, she 
may put to the front of the queue an obviously ill asylum seeker on grounds of 
humanity, even if practice at the clinic is to give preference to South African citizens. 
And then there is the kind of gate-keeping that Pellegrino describes as “morally 
indefensible”, where the gate-keeper is motivated by self-interest and uses her role a 
gate-keeper to enrich herself27. This might involve requiring money or favours from 
asylum seekers or refugees in order to give them access to basic health care 
services.   
 
Bearing in mind the foregoing discussion, it is important to highlight the potential 
benefit or virtue of gate-keeping. In setting the basis of discussion to follow, I am 
asserting that gate-keeping can be considered a legitimate and morally defensible 
practice. That is, if it is practiced with morally justifiable intent, serves a morally 
justifiable outcome and if the gate-keeping processes followed meet ethical practice 
standards. Gate-keeping seems particularly important in South African society where 
resources are considered limited and where distributive and re-distributive 
considerations have forward-looking as well as historical significance.  
 
In closing the discussion of gate-keeping it can be said that it seems to be an 
intuitive social and cultural response in certain situations. Of interest to the essay 
topic, however, is intentional gate-keeping on a societal and institutional level. Gate-
keeping practice is also attached to roles, such as that of policy makers, officials and 
health care service providers. Its function is to potentially support the protection of 
                                                          
27
 Ibid., p.44. 
 
21 
 
something. If applied in the interest of distributive and re-distributive justice on an 
institutional level and role related responsibilities, the practice of gate-keeping seems 
justifiable. The conscious and transparent practice thereof might ensure fairness 
and, in fact, give expression to what the South African Constitution stands for.  
However, gate-keeping cannot be morally justified when practiced in service of 
protecting exclusiveness at cost to the basic human needs of others or for compatriot 
or personal gain in a way that interferes with fairness in relation to individuals and 
collectives. 
 
4. South Africa as a moral arena – distinctive outlooks 
 
The discussion that follows is based on the premise that South African citizens in 
general, although presumably not exclusively, draw from two distinctive moral 
outlooks. The one perspective stems from a human rights paradigm, originating from 
Western contexts, in which the individual is centrally placed. In fact, it may be more 
accurate to say that the individual and her moral worth and dignity are centrally 
placed. A society structured according to this paradigm affords the individual 
freedom, autonomy, responsibility and certain claims in order to flourish, reflecting 
the philosophy of liberalism. The other outlook concerns the individual whose 
morality is defined in relation to others, where emphasis is placed on community. 
This outlook originates from African contexts, although not exclusively so, as Eastern 
cultures seem to be structured along similar beliefs. Morality finds expression in 
connection, without which the individual cannot flourish and construct a meaningful 
life. For the purposes of this essay, the focus rests on what both these perspectives 
might say about the ethics of gate-keeping in relation to asylum seekers and 
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refugees who seek basic health care. This exploration, in the main, falls onto 
deontological and virtue ethics ground within the field of applied ethics.  
 
4.1  Human Rights 
 
It could be said that present-day South Africa is a human rights society. After a 
reprehensible era of oppression and discrimination brought about by colonialism and 
apartheid, a democratic system was established. In this South African society, all 
persons are, or perhaps more realistically stated - ought to be - considered equal 
and free. This kind of mind-set echoes universal human rights discourse with a 
cosmopolitan quality.  
 
The sort of cosmopolitanism pertinent here involves an attitude and action of a 
person who identifies with humanity beyond her own family, community and tribe, 
and who accepts responsibility to do what is right by other humans, regardless of 
whether others are compatriots. Such is the sentiment that Christine Sypnowich 
refers to as “cosmopolitanism of global justice”28, proposing that each member of any 
society is entitled to access to the basic goods in order to create a minimally decent 
life. The basic goods relevant to this essay are basic health care services. In 
Rawlsian terms, the nature of what is considered basic goods would be what is 
considered fair to all without foreknowledge of, for instance, what one’s innate 
abilities, social standing, race or gender might be29. In other words, if all are in the 
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same (“original”30) position, there would be agreement that access to basic health 
care would be essential for everyone, including those who might be the “worst off” in 
society31. It seems reasonable to say that asylum seekers and refugees who are the 
focus of this essay perceivably fit the description of the worst off or, at least, lean in 
that direction.   
 
Upon acceptance of a human rights perspective, with the sort of cosmopolitan base 
mentioned above, all human beings should be viewed as morally equal and entitled 
to the same basic freedoms on South African soil, including non-nationals and all 
other persons across the globe. However, the manner in which gate-keeping is 
practiced in relation to many asylum seekers and refugees seeking basic health care 
services seems to show a lack of respect for human rights. This stark reality evokes 
unease and, at times, moral outrage, placing a question mark on whether a human 
rights perspective in South Africa is really entrenched all the way down.  
 
The discussion that follows aims to develop an argument that a human rights 
perspective cannot be matched with the type of gate-keeping that denies human 
dignity. Therefore, if South Africa claims to have a democracy rooted in human 
rights, the systems put in place ought to reflect gate-keeping practices that respect 
human dignity. Furthermore, it will be argued that those who adopt a liberal human 
rights framework as their moral compass, are unlikely to condone or apply gate-
keeping practices that deny dignity to another human. These claims will be made 
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with an acknowledgement of the associated ethical dilemma that it may not be 
possible to meet everyone’s need and right to have basic health care.   
   
Firstly, some background about the development and notion of human rights. 
Historical evidence of human rights discourse can be traced back as far as the 
ancient Greeks32. They acknowledged that rules made by man can prove to be 
“‘unjust’ when considered within a wider conception of justice”33. Confirmation exists 
of bills of rights that have been written up since the 1200’s34. However, the 
philosophical frame of liberalism and human rights was originally proposed by John 
Locke35. Locke challenged autocracy and proposed what has become liberalism, 
where persons are considered equal, have a right to be treated with respect and 
dignity, afforded freedom and self-determination and a voice36. Following on from 
this, Immanuel Kant developed the idea that the individual is an autonomous moral 
agent. He emphasised the capacity of humans to reason and that the individual can 
choose right action by applying her mind. Correspondingly, other individuals are 
considered moral agents with the capacity to reason and choose37. 
 
In modern times, it was the global outcry about the atrocities committed during the 
Second World War that placed human rights discourse in the universal sphere. This 
undertaking led to the establishment of the United Nations in 1945, one of its 
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functions being to work towards the realisation of human rights across the globe38. 
As pointed out by the late Arthur Chaskalson, the first President of the Constitutional 
Court of South Africa, universal commitment to the realisation of human rights is 
aspirational in nature39. Chaskalson draws attention to the fact that, despite the 
universal call for the respect of human rights, violations of rights across the globe 
continue40. Human rights violations also seem evident in South Africa, despite its 
being a signatory to the UN and pledging to protect human rights41. Even so, and in 
line with the tone of Chaskalson’s further discussion42 imagine a world without a call 
for human rights and universal efforts to promote recognition of each human being, 
by virtue of being human, as being worthy of respect. Such sentiments seem to point 
to a cosmopolitan mind-set, as mentioned earlier. Following this line of thinking, 
Pauline Kleingeld and Eric Brown talk of moral cosmopolitanism - about the concept 
of all humans being part of a community - where we have “a moral commitment to 
helping human beings”43. Moderately framed, such a view does not deny other 
affiliations44 but seems to suggest that as far as human rights are concerned, 
nationality might be considered a morally arbitrary factor.          
 
Against this background, one could then ask what it means exactly when we speak 
of human rights. Human rights could be understood as norms that, at a basic level, 
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tell us what all humans should be afforded to create a minimally decent life for 
themselves. Human rights also act as norms to protect persons from acts that would 
violate their humanity. The spirit in which such norms are portrayed essentially 
appears to acknowledge human moral worth, and equal moral worth, and that their 
freedom to choose and be should not be interfered with. Following on from this, a 
human rights perspective holds that human beings can lay claim to protection from 
abuses against their humanity. They may also lay claim to the basic goods to live a 
minimally decent life. Claims place an obligation on others and, in this way, human 
rights are a two way process45 in which rights and duties exist as two sides of the 
same coin.  
 
A further feature of human rights, as James Nickel points out, is that they are 
“plural”46. No one human right can cover the spectrum of protection and/or goods 
needed by any person. Having said that, there might be dispute about what should 
be included in a list of human rights. It might also transpire that context specific 
conditions call for prioritising certain rights over others47. Furthermore, the idea of 
human rights is that one cannot lose a right even if those rights might be curtailed 
under certain circumstances48.    
 
The rights in question are moral rights. A disregard of basic human rights can be 
considered a disregard of a person’s humanity. This notion is in line with the concept 
that we are all part of a moral community49 where our nationality, ethnicity, race or 
gender ought not to define what we should be afforded in the basic human rights 
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sense. It could be considered morally wrong and unjust to deny a person the basic 
goods and protections from certain kinds of treatment such as torture. Some human 
rights are also legal rights, although I would argue that human rights are first of all 
moral rights by virtue of our humanity. The notion of human rights captures a way of 
acknowledging each other by virtue of our shared humanity, some of which 
translates into legal claims and protections. 
 
Placing the human rights discourse in the South African context, Saul Dubow says 
that “South Africa offers a unique case study for historians of human rights. Its 
extended colonial history invites us to consider the development of several 
competing rights ‘regimes’ – liberal, Afrikaner, and African nationalist – whose 
political salience can be broadly correlated with distinct phases of political power”50.  
As it has been standing since 1996, South Africa has a Constitution that is based on 
a human rights philosophy, where the individual’s moral worth is unquestionable and 
that discrimination cannot be practiced on the basis of morally arbitrary 
considerations. In this sense, the term “morally arbitrary” refers to chance factors, 
that are not created by will or choice.       
 
South Africa’s democracy, constitutionally and institutionally speaking, is built on the 
tenets of a liberal democratic society where the rights of individuals are recognised 
and respected and where discrimination is not condoned on the basis of morally 
arbitrary factors. The South African Constitution encapsulates the principles of a 
human rights culture in which the dignity of every human being is acknowledged.  
Section 10 specifically states that “[e]veryone has inherent dignity and the right to 
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have their dignity respected and protected”. Furthermore, pertaining to the focus of 
this essay, the Constitution states that every person has the right to “basic health 
care services …” (Section 27)51. Therefore, providing basic health care might be 
seen as an aspirational positive duty. Even though it might be argued that our 
Constitution confirms a legal claim to basic health care, in light of earlier discussion I 
would hold that our Constitution attaches legal weight to the right to basic health care 
because it is a moral right.     
 
In the spirit of an acknowledgement of human rights, in this case moral and legal, 
refugees and asylum seekers ought to be treated with dignity and enjoy the same 
certain basic rights as South Africans. The Refugees Act 1930 of 1998 advocates 
putting into practice the spirit of treating each human being with dignity. In Chapter 5, 
section 27 it is stated that “[a] refugee – (g) is entitled to the same basic health 
services and basic primary education which the inhabitants of the Republic receive 
from time to time”52. For instance, the sentiment concerning the rights or the standing 
of asylum seekers to work and study in South Africa has been tested in the matter of 
The Minister of Home Affairs and Muriel Millie Watchenuka53. The Honourable Judge 
JA Nugent states that “[h]uman dignity has no nationality. It is inherent in all people – 
citizens and non-citizens alike – simply because they are human. And while that 
person happens to be in this country – for whatever reason – it must be respected, 
and is protected, by the Bill of Rights”54. At the same time, Judge JA Nugent signals 
that rights are not unlimited and that contextual factors play a role in this regard. In 
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the context of this essay, the latter point may be drawn back to social justice 
considerations, limited resources in South Africa and the need to distribute resources 
fairly.  
 
Despite the possible reality of limited resources, South Africa’s Constitution 
resonates with international recognition of human rights. Therefore, the dignity of 
each human being is acknowledged, regardless of whether South Africa can indeed 
meet the basic needs of all. The South African government adheres to a policy of 
integration with regards to those who seek refuge in South Africa. Accordingly, 
asylum seekers and refugees in South Africa are given the right to basic health care. 
Both our Constitutional framework, as well as our Government’s policy of integration, 
seem to imply a moral cosmopolitan way of thinking. Gate-keeping design, in its 
potentially justifiable form, could play an important role to address the dilemmas 
brought about by need overshadowing available resources. It could also provide a 
framework for the fair distribution of health care resources. Through even-handed 
distribution of resources, asylum seekers and refugees could receive basic services 
motivated by respect for their dignity as human beings. At the same time, through 
proper gate-keeping practices, it might be ensured that South African citizens are not 
disadvantaged.  
 
So far, I am asserting that South Africa might claim to be a society shaped by human 
rights by virtue of its Constitution. Even though the Constitution is a legal document, 
it is also a morally aspirational document with a cosmopolitan undertone. I am also 
departing from a basis that a portion of South Africans hold liberal human rights 
values as their personal and role based moral compass. Within a society shaped by 
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human rights, all humans have certain claims so as to allow each person to live a 
minimally decent life. Health care is essential to any person’s well-being at the most 
basic level. Therefore, considered from a human rights viewpoint, each person has a 
right to basic health care. To deny any person, regardless of nationality, this right 
would be to deny their dignity as well as the basic goods in order to live a minimally 
decent life. I am suggesting that this applies to institutional directives as well as the 
personal and role morality of those who work within institutions.  
 
Furthermore, within a human rights perspective, any kind of discrimination that 
denies any person the very basic goods to live a minimally decent life will most likely 
not be considered just. Understood in this way, even those who have certain of their 
rights curtailed due to their choices, for example because they are in prison as a 
result of their criminal activity, cannot be denied access to, for instance, clean water, 
food and basic health care. Following this line of thinking, South African citizens may 
claim basic health care as a right, but not deny this right to anyone else. If it is 
accepted that basic health care is a moral right, and, in South Africa, it is also a legal 
right, gate-keeping practices on all levels ought to respect it.   
 
Objections are anticipated. One objection might hold that a human rights framework 
is inappropriate in the South African context. It is not an African moral framework, it 
originates from the West and the majority of South Africans are not of Western 
origin. Therefore, a human rights framework cannot be used to evaluate South 
African practices. Such a view corresponds with debate regarding the universal 
acceptance or non-acceptance of human rights as embraced by the Universal 
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Declaration of Human Rights55. It might be said that it cannot be reasonably 
expected from all persons across the globe to accept a moral viewpoint rooted in a 
liberal human rights outlook that places the individual centrally. Other moral 
frameworks may, for example, place the collective centrally and not the individual 
and their rights56. Therefore a liberal human rights approach cannot be assumed 
relevant all the way down in South African society. Whilst South Africans perhaps 
negotiated and adopted a framework that would ensure a peaceful way forward after 
the apartheid period in South Africa, it needs to be contextualised as a political 
solution at a time. The objector might concede that Western moral influences should 
not necessarily be dismissed and that a number of South Africans may hold a human 
rights moral compass, but that it is unsuitable to put it forward as the framework 
according to which ethical judgements about gate-keeping are made.   
 
Considering the objection, it seems important to take into account the view that a 
liberal human rights framework was accepted for political reasons in the South 
African context. Crush’s statement seems relevant here: “The question … is whether 
ordinary South Africans have embraced the new ‘official’ human rights culture and, 
indeed, how the populace understands the concepts and essence of ‘human rights’ 
protection in the first place”57. This question may also be asked of the South African 
Government. As an example, their failure in 2015 to detain Sudan's President Omar 
al-Bashir, found guilty by the International Criminal Court of crimes against 
humanity58, casts doubts about the extent of the Government commitment to uphold 
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accountability regarding protection of human rights. Our Government’s subsequent 
withdrawal from the ICC seems to be further evidence of a lack of commitment to 
hold themselves and others accountable in the global arena as far as the protection 
of human rights goes. Taking these references into account, there appears to be a 
disconnection between what has been politically accepted and what is practiced.  
 
However, despite these ambiguities and without naively saying that the majority vote 
means consensus and universal acceptance, a human rights perspective cannot 
reasonably be rejected now that it may not feel like a good fit with non-Western 
moral viewpoints. In fact, resistance to apartheid rule was based on the premise that 
the freedom and equality of the majority of South Africans was denied. This is human 
rights language. The Freedom Charter, considered a fundamental document 
preceding our existing Bill of Rights, speaks of respect for human rights59. So, to say 
that a human rights framework is not an appropriate reference to evaluate gate-
keeping practices in the South African context does not hold convincingly.   
 
However, concluding my response to the objection at this point might not be 
sufficient. So, consider the following: it is agreed, at least for the sake of argument, 
that the human rights perspective as upheld in this discussion is of Western origin. It 
focusses on the rights and freedoms of the individual and considers Western 
philosophers significant in defining liberalism and human rights. It is granted that a 
human rights perspective might not be universally acceptable, perhaps particularly in 
non-Western societies. By the same token, I would maintain that a human rights 
perspective (and the kind of gate-keeping it might consider morally justifiable) cannot 
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be rejected outright just because it has Western origins. The bottom line to me 
seems to be that, in as far as basic human needs are at stake, any moral framework 
that denies any human being the basic goods to live a minimally decent life is open 
to interrogation. This idea will be further explored in the later section that focusses on 
patriotic bias.     
  
For now, the objection seems to say that a human being needs basic health care, 
another human being on behalf of a system says that the person in need cannot 
have it. The reason given is because the person in need cannot lay claim to human 
rights, even if it means that the person will, as a result, not be able to have the 
necessary goods to live a minimally decent life. The consequences may be that the 
person perishes or is disadvantaged, but never mind, because a human rights 
approach is inappropriate in an African context. This is a crude statement of the 
objection. But, even if toned down, closing the basic health care gates on anyone 
evokes serious moral unease. The following statement by Phillip Cole in connection 
with basic health care articulates this unease: “If we cannot find a way of making an 
ethically principled distinction between citizens and migrants that can act as a moral 
basis for discrimination … then we may find that what many regard as an ethical 
project rests on deeply immoral foundations60.   
 
In principle such gate-keeping and denial of the basic means to live resonates with 
the stories of asylum seekers and refugees who seek a new life in South Africa.  
They tell about the disregard of their safety and dignity, and the refusal of basic 
goods needed to live a minimally decent life in their home countries. Studying the 
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histories of countries such as Somalia, Nigeria, DRC and Zimbabwe, provides 
sufficient evidence of this. This is not to propose that a human rights perspective 
trumps other viewpoints concerning refugees and asylum seekers in need of basic 
health care in whichever territories they find themselves. A human rights foundation 
does, however, make clear that all human beings are worthy of respect and that 
fellow human beings are morally wrong to deny them that which they need to live.  
 
A home example can be used to support this point. During the years of the 
Nationalist Party reign, during which time the majority of South Africans were 
systemically and legally denied dignity, the international community spoke up. It 
condemned the denial of rights to oppressed South Africans. Presumably, these 
responses were informed by human rights inclinations, but strong support was also 
expressed from non-Western countries. There was recognition that the denial of 
basic freedoms and life goods was morally wrong. 
  
Following on from this, it seems reasonable to say that it needs to be tested whether 
non-Western moral outlooks indeed deny that persons should not be afforded basic 
health care as an acknowledgement of their humanity and dignity. Evidence of 
instances where such denial might indeed be held as morally true, seem to me to be 
extremist doctrines. Such doctrines seem to contain elements of keeping intact role 
definitions that serve those in power. The continued practice of female genital 
mutilation61 and denying girls education62 are examples here. In fact, as will be 
explored in the next section, Ubuntu precepts (as an example of a non-Western 
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moral outlook) might support the idea that to deny another human being basic health 
care could be considered unethical.  
 
A second objection could be framed this way: It is accepted that all human beings 
are of equal moral worth and ought to have the basic goods and freedoms in order to 
lead a minimally decent life. A rights perspective is granted, within which the right to 
basic health care is recognised. The objector might continue that it would be morally 
wrong to maliciously cause harm to another person and to wilfully violate their rights.  
However, the objector might say, the instance of violating another person’s right 
should be differentiated from infringing on another person’s right. Judith Jarvis 
Thomson might be appealed to. She makes this distinction, illustrated by her thought 
experiment of someone waking up, finding herself connected to a famous violinist 
who needs the use of her kidneys to survive. As Thomson points out, surely the 
violinist has a right to life, but it would not be unjust for the person whose kidneys he 
is using, to disconnect herself from him. An infringement of the violinist’s right to life 
seems justifiable in these circumstances63.  
 
Along the same lines, it could be argued that asylum seekers and refugees might 
have a right to basic health care, but those who they appeal to may not necessarily 
be unjust in failing to meet that need. Samantha Brennan calls instances of this 
nature “justified infringements of rights”64. She explains that rights are not absolute 
and “that some infringings are instead ‘overridings’ … the positive case of failing to 
accord a right when doing so is permitted on the basis of consequences at stake”65.  
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The objector might say that the economic consequences for South Africa, as a 
developing country, in meeting the right of asylum seekers and refugees to basic 
health care, justify an infringement of that right. This argument resonates with the 
notion of patriotic bias discussed later in the essay.  
  
This is a compelling objection. It requires consideration of how much is at stake66 
when the basic health care rights of asylum seekers and refugees are overridden. 
Such stakes also apply to the basic health care needs of South Africans, as 
discussed later in the essay when patriotic bias is considered. One way to answer 
the question is to imagine that gate-keeping practices deny basic health care 
services to refugees and asylum seekers. Picture the range of consequences: 
mothers giving birth unassisted and the potential risks involved to the baby and the 
mother, children dying of diarrhoea, and adults suffering heart disease as a result of 
untreated high blood pressure. Many more examples could be offered. These 
examples, I think, make clear the injustice of such infringement. The stakes seem to 
be too high should access to basic health care be denied, not only for the person 
who holds the right but also for those who might be faced with the moral 
accountability and practical consequences. Therefore, a distinction between having a 
right and the possible justifiability of infringing upon that right is granted. At the same 
time it is asserted that, in the case of basic health care, the stakes are too high not to 
meet the need as best as possible and infringement of the right is not morally 
justifiable. 
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It is nevertheless recognised that South Africa is a developing country where social 
need is evident in almost every corner. Even though it might be morally true that we 
ought to provide in the basic health care needs of citizens and non-nationals it might 
be said that South Africa simply cannot afford to do so. On the basis of feasibility, 
our human rights obligation is, arguably, therefore mitigated. As stated by Nick 
Ferreira “[t]he protection of a particular right might therefore be feasible if it was the 
only thing that we cared about, but may be infeasible given that societies have 
numerous other priorities to address”67. Furthermore, the details of the non-feasible 
objection need to be scrutinised as the lack of resources argument might not stand 
without contextualising other kinds of State spending. If respect for human rights is 
observed in South Africa it needs to translate into political will to provide basic 
needs, justifiably at the cost of perceivably less important State spending. Only with 
evidence of such intention, the objection might hold more weight in that South Africa 
cannot immediately and completely provide for the basic health care needs of 
asylum seekers and refugees68.  
 
To close: Arguments in favour of, as well as objections concerning, a human rights 
position in the South African context in relation to gate-keeping practices relating to 
asylum seekers and refugees seeking basic health care in South Africa have been 
offered. It is concluded that, morally speaking, asylum seekers and refugees’ basic 
health care needs ought to be met as far as possible. Gate-keeping policies and 
practices from the constitutional level to ground level ought to reflect such 
accommodation. Not to demonstrate such a mind-set seems morally wrong if the 
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dignity of the individual and their right to be afforded the basic goods to live a 
minimally decent life is taken seriously. This position is asserted notwithstanding the 
practical and perhaps even impossible nature of the task.      
 
4.2 Ubuntu 
 
In the foregoing section, it has been argued that gate-keeping practices, according to 
a human rights perspective, ought to respect basic health care as a human right for 
everyone. However, some might still insist that a liberal human rights (cosmopolitan 
inclined) perspective, with Western roots, ought to be rejected on the basis of 
irrelevance or inappropriateness in South Africa. As stated by Chuma Himonga  
“… one of the challenges to enforcing human rights in Africa is the lack of cultural 
legitimacy of the rights among the people intended to benefit from them”69. If it 
proves to be true that a liberal human rights perspective is inappropriate, what might 
African ways suggest about closing or opening the gates when refugees and asylum 
seekers present with health needs? In exploring this question, I am not trying to 
argue for possible similarities between an African moral outlook and a liberal human 
rights perspective. I am also not trying to argue that these outlooks might be 
compatible. What seems to be important to explore here is what African morality 
might propose justifiable health care services gate-keeping practices to be when  
strangers make themselves at home in South African territory. 
 
To start, what is an African moral outlook? A likely African moral framework to refer 
to is Ubuntu because it is a recognised moral perspective in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is 
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not assumed that Ubuntu is the only African way according to which morality might 
be understood70. Furthermore, appealing to Ubuntu is not to “pursu[e] ... the search 
to animate an otherwise outdated mode of being”71 as it might be said that Ubuntu in 
its historical form does not predominate any longer. Munyaka and Motlhabi explain 
that Ubuntu historically encouraged friendliness, kindness and generosity towards 
strangers72. In essence, Ubuntu asserts that “[y]ou are welcome, we will help you 
and we respect you”73. However, the character of Ubuntu may have changed over 
time in the sense that it is perhaps now being selectively practiced in inner circles of 
families and communities, but not necessarily to all persons and in work places 
where individualist and capitalist mind-sets prevail. Munyaka and Motlhabi raise the 
question as to why the historical character of Ubuntu in terms of the treatment of 
strangers has changed. In response, they quote Steve Biko’s description of the 
negative changes as the “process of bastardisation of Ubuntu” through South 
Africa’s colonial and apartheid history as well the trend of capitalist development74. 
 
This may be so. However, whilst the character of Ubuntu might be changing, it does 
not seem to have been disregarded as a moral philosophy on the whole. Morally 
speaking, the individual and/or institutional moral agent needs to exercise choice and 
responsibility. Notwithstanding the destructive impact of colonialism and apartheid, it 
seems prudent not to conclude that a changing and/or perhaps less compelling 
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Ubuntu way of thinking and life might leave moral agents without a moral compass 
and diminished accountability for their moral decisions.  
      
Furthermore, whilst the point is taken that “it is not always clear what that African 
voice could be taken to represent”75, the potency of the African way remains visible 
in everyday life and political speech in South Africa. The following quote from the 
recently released King IV Report on Corporate Governance South Africa 2016 
attests to this: 
 
This idea of interdependency between organisations and society is supported 
by the African concept of Ubuntu or Botho, captured by the expressions … I 
am because you are; you are because we are. Ubuntu and Botho imply that 
there should be a common purpose to all human endeavours (including 
corporate endeavours) which is based on service to humanity. … As a logical 
consequence of this interdependency, one person benefits by serving 
another76. 
 
So, to be clear, it is not argued that Ubuntu is the moral compass of black African 
people. Neither is it suggested that it should be. At the same time, it is considered a 
significant African moral outlook and, in the likely absence of other more compelling 
and/or widely described African moral perspectives it is of interest what Ubuntu 
might say about gate-keeping practices.  
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What, then, is Ubuntu about?  Ubuntu, as a moral perspective, prioritises the idea of 
community and the collective. It places a premium on interdependence and solidarity 
and treating others with respect, dignity and compassion77. Ubuntu is a way of being, 
where personhood is shaped and defined through being in relationship and 
community with others. As pointed out by Edwin Etieyibo, Ubuntu is “a philosophy of 
lived experience … that one might say, is virtue-sensitive”78. Following this line of 
thinking Thaddeus Metz goes on to say that Ubuntu as a moral orientation based on 
the foundational principle that “[a] person is a person through other persons”79. 
Similarly, Augustine Shutte explains that a person’s “self exists only in relationship 
with others” in Ubuntu understanding80. Moral maturity is a life-long striving and 
process that finds fulfilment in relation to others. This is different from an 
individualistic liberal self-actualisation concept, where a person strives to fulfil 
inherent potential through being autonomous and striving for freedom81, which may 
or may not reflect this kind of connectedness with others.   
 
Virtue, in Ubuntu terms, seems to mean that good acts flow from the person who is 
fundamentally “umuntu (a human being)”82. Humanness, therefore, as a moral 
concept, finds expression through human connectedness and orienting oneself in 
ways that are “friendly” or at least not harmful to others83. Whilst this may sound like 
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what most moral frameworks would advocate, Ubuntu places this notion within the 
perspective that it is not possible for a person to be a moral being independently of 
others. Munyaradzi Felix Murove says that “[s]uch interrelationality is what most 
scholars have observed as the feature that best sums up African ethics”84. Following 
on from this, the importance of connectedness and morality finding expression in 
relation to others has implications for someone whose worldview is based on 
Ubuntu. Through its “anti-egoistic”85 characteristic an individual recognises another 
as inherently worthy of dignity and respect and that honouring same gives each 
person opportunity to express their morality86. Seen this way, individuals exist in 
community with each other and need each other to be fully human87, which could be 
described as the interdependence characteristic of Ubuntu88. 
 
Focusing more specifically on health and health care, an Ubuntu perspective would 
be to consider the whole person. Being well, on the whole, is important and it would 
not be acceptable to objectify the person as a patient who presents with symptoms.  
As Shutte points out, being healthy in the broad sense of the meaning is necessary 
for a person to flourish89. Responding to illness is therefore not only a matter of 
treatment and overcoming the illness, but also concern that another’s journey of 
flourishing as a human being is impeded. Such a state of affairs is of concern to the 
others and the community90. Hence, attending to health and wellness holistically is 
seen as a means to flourishing as a human being. Accordingly, an Ubuntu mind-set 
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ought to reflect recognition of the personhood of the other, that the person who 
needs health care is important and valued91. The virtue-sensitive quality of Ubuntu, 
referred to earlier, is discernible here. 
 
So far, drawing on the philosophical insights of Ubuntu scholars, it seems that 
Ubuntu is a paradigm in which the individual is recognised and prized, but that moral 
virtue is lived out and considered in terms of the individual’s contribution to the 
dignity and well-being of others and community harmony. Morality independent of 
connectedness is not possible. Responding to the health care needs of others in a 
way that allows the other to flourish is a moral issue. Disregarding such needs would 
be contrary to the spirit of Ubuntu. These perceptions are advanced from the point of 
view of the moral agent who chooses their attitude and action. 
 
Shifting position to the point of view of the one in need, what might such a person lay 
claim to? Munyaka and Mothlabi say that “[t]raditionally, one’s rights, to use the 
language of rights, were not understood simply as statements about entitlement, but 
also about responsibility and obligation towards others. Ubuntu accords priority to 
both duties and rights; both are inalienable from all persons”92. If this is true, persons 
might feel justified in appealing for their health care needs to be met. Although their 
claim does not absolve them from any responsibility, Ubuntu gives them the 
expectation of having their basic health care needs met. Munyaka and Mothlabi 
assert that responding to such need “is not a matter of charity”93, it is what ought to 
be done.   
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Echoing the same sentiment Bénézet Bujo94 asserts that the African way would 
require that rights be considered in the context of the collective interest. A right 
needs to be justified in terms of its importance to both the individual and community. 
If I understand Bujo correctly, it would imply that a person’s claim to basic health 
care would need to be evaluated against the respect and dignity afforded to them as 
an individual, seen within the context of what is in the interest of the community. In 
other words, would denying basic health care be disregarding their humanity? Of 
equal importance would be to evaluate a positive response to their need in the light 
of the community’s interest: would denying them such rights be in the interest or to 
the detriment of community, harmony and solidarity. This is not a consequentialist 
viewpoint as the kind of deliberation is not, fundamentally, about the best outcome 
for the greatest number. It is about the understanding that responding to, or potential 
withholding of goods, would play a part in the lifelong striving to become more 
human through an attitude of care for others and wishing them to be well so that one 
can also be well. Bujo states that “[b]y respecting the rights of the individual, the 
community preserves its own identity, and the same is true of the individual 
himself”95. 
 
If these views are accepted, one might expect that Ubuntu as a moral outlook 
potentially speaks to a way of life on all levels of society. It informs the political 
sphere, conceptions of justice, the way societies and communities are structured, 
and how institutions are shaped. It also informs the expectations of communities, 
families and individuals. Considering the essay question, it is relevant to consider 
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how Ubuntu precepts might inform the matter of health care on legislative and 
institutional levels and what sort of attitude and conduct it might require of a person 
providing the health care. Would it lean towards permissiveness and respond to the 
health care needs of all who might need it? Would a health care clinic operating 
according to Ubuntu management principles be considered friendly to all in need of 
health care, and would the official and health care service provider in attendance be 
considered ethical or unethical when they practice permissive or exclusionary gate-
keeping practices? 
 
Exploration now potentially moves into more contentious territory. The importance of 
community and interdependence, dignity afforded to all and the importance attached 
to well-being seen holistically and as a community concern sounds laudable. 
However, what ought one do when the precepts of Ubuntu conflict with each other?  
And, who/what is considered community?   
 
Starting with the latter, Matolino and Kwindingwi make the point that “ubuntu works 
effectively in situations where communities are small and undifferentiated”96. They 
continue to say that “such communities are notorious for their dislike of outsiders, 
intolerance towards divergent ideas and place a high price and value on blood 
relations in recognising the other”97. Such a view may lean towards being anti-
cosmopolitan, in that we do not essentially have duties beyond those close to us98. 
This might be one explanation for the kind of exclusionary gate-keeping practices 
concerning refugees and asylum seekers.   
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However, it does not sit comfortably as a justification for not attending to a person in 
need of health care assistance, because Ubuntu also prizes human dignity. If my 
understanding of Ubuntu is correct, responding to anyone in dire need would be 
required. Mpumi Zondi explains that the spirit of Ubuntu is carried within a person, 
wherever one goes, and that kindness is not restricted to one’s kin. By the same 
token, she explains that Ubuntu does not mean that one should allow exploitation.  
Setting boundaries and holding others accountable for what is theirs to own is 
important99. One could put forward an example of a child drowning in a pond100. If 
someone passes by a child drowning in a pond it would not be morally justifiable not 
to help the child. Similarly, it could be argued that closing the gates on an asylum 
seeker or refugee in need of health care would be morally unjustifiable in Ubuntu 
terms. It is granted that not every asylum seeker and refugee claiming health care is 
like a child drowning in a pond. Moreover, the debate about what constitutes basic 
health care is granted101. All the same, the principle that requires recognition here is 
that Ubuntu is not restricted only to who is around you; it is also about who you are, 
all the way down. In this version one could argue that someone living according to 
Ubuntu precepts would be motivated to be friendly towards others, to acknowledge 
them and to be empathic towards their needs. It could be that small undifferentiated 
communities perhaps wish to keep their communities tight and not allow strangers in.  
At the same time, this might be true of a variety of homogeneous communities such 
as the Afrikaner community of Orania, Orthodox Jewish groups and the Amish.  
However, I would argue that a person does not leave their Ubuntu behind when they 
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are not with their own people or are living amongst others who do not share an 
Ubuntu philosophy. To conclude this point, de-humanising treatment of any person 
who is in need of health care seems contrary to the essence of Ubuntu. This would 
apply to a lack of evidence of Ubuntu on legislative, institutional and personal and/or 
professional role specific levels.  
 
It seems to me that the more difficult ethical dilemma to discuss, related to the notion 
of community, is providing health care to so-called strangers at perceived cost to 
one’s own people. Whilst it might be so that an Ubuntu approach would grant that all 
in need ought to be treated with respect and dignity, solidarity may call for protection 
of resources. It might be argued that solidarity is called for by South Africans 
because health care resources are limited and perhaps not even enough for citizens.   
So, it could be morally required from an Ubuntu inclined person to rescue the child 
from the pond once, twice and perhaps even many more times, but if the same 
situation repeats itself thousands of times, what could reasonable by expected? It 
could be argued that asylum seekers and refugees are presumably not all like the 
drowning child in the pond in terms of emergency medical need. Furthermore, they 
are in South Africa uninvited and typically intend staying and order to build a life for 
themselves here. South African citizens, therefore, have to share already limited 
resources with them. Considering that not enough health care resources appear to 
be available to meet the needs of South Africans, there may be a call for solidarity by 
means of structuring exclusionary health care services, restrictive institutional 
directives, through to the health care provider closing the gates in order to protect 
resources.  
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Metz offers insights in this regard. He does not address the question of gate-keeping 
in relation to asylum seekers and refugees per se, but talks about the morality of 
partiality and impartiality in terms of favouring those close to one102. The morally 
justifiable criteria for preferential treatment of some are restricted to matters of re-
distributive justice103. Partiality and favouring some are therefore granted, and Metz 
states that “[a] civil servant’s duty not to be strongly partial derives from the state’s 
need to realise harmony”104. Even though an individual gate-keeper is implied here, I 
would argue that the principle appeals to all levels of gate-keeping, as discussed 
earlier. The African-morality viewpoint, if Metz’s argument is accepted, would 
therefore not condone withholding of State resources, such as basic health care. 
Doing so would be contrary to promoting unity.  
 
Somehow, whilst this line of thinking seems reasonable, it does not resolve the 
ethical dilemma. It seems to me that herein rests the most compelling objection to 
the argument. It could be argued that even though a withholding of State resources 
might be considered unethical, South Africa needs to promote unity amongst South 
Africans, perhaps signalling an anti-cosmopolitan attitude in service of self-
protection105. Whilst strangers need to be treated with kindness and their needs 
acknowledged, when there is not enough to go around one is permitted to first take 
care of one’s own. Is it morally required of South Africans to seek unity and harmony 
with asylum seekers? It could be said that Ubuntu is invoked by politicians and the 
privileged to ease tensions for political and capitalist reasons and it is not reasonable 
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to expect South Africans to strive for unity with strangers who need to share in 
limited resources. Xenophobic attacks might signal such sentiments.  
 
In reply to the objection, it seems to me that nothing in what Ubuntu stands for can 
justify a de-humanising system, denial of a person in need and mistreatment of 
another human being. This does not mean that when a person or group is under 
attack that pacifism and accommodating exploitation are called for. Asylum seekers 
and refugees are possibly perceived to be encroaching upon what rightfully belongs 
to South Africans and, in that sense, citizens might feel under attack. However, 
asserting this kind of thinking through to its conclusion may be difficult as refugees 
and asylum seekers are typically victims of unjust circumstances. They do not 
appear to come to South African out of a position of strength, eager for ‘combat’. 
They are typically struggling for survival, to varying degrees akin to a child drowning 
in a pond. With reference to discussion earlier in the essay, they also have been 
given legal standing in the South African system, i.e. in this case their human right to 
have access to basic health care is considered a legal right. This is not the case for 
those who do not have any legal standing such as undocumented migrants.  
Furthermore, they are not what could be considered medical tourists to South Africa. 
These would be tourists seeking medical treatment at perhaps more affordable rates 
and without having long waiting times for medical interventions106. I would argue that 
the conditions under which asylum seekers and refugees seek access to health care 
services in South Africa calls for humane treatment. 
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Reflecting on the foregoing discussion, it might seem that the objection has not been 
dealt with firmly enough. This might be so because of the complexity of the ethical 
dilemmas, considered from an Ubuntu moral outlook. To conclude in a more defined 
manner: my inclination is to acknowledge that there might be disagreement in 
defining community, whether the notion of community pertains to those closest or 
whether community is thought of in the cosmopolitan sense of the word. Questions 
arise about who one ought to seek solidarity with and how collective interest is 
defined. According to the Ubuntu way, should one strive to be in unity with all those 
who make up the human community? Or is it morally acceptable to give preference 
to the interests of close others, knowing that by doing so others do not have the 
means to live a minimally decent life? Notwithstanding these possibly slippery slope 
areas, I would hold that Ubuntu principles might prioritise dignity and humanness in 
response to anyone in need, leaning towards a cosmopolitan attitude rather than a 
strictly own-community stance. As Zondi107 says, and reflecting the virtue-sensitive 
quality highlighted by Etieyibo108, Ubuntu is within you and you practice it where-ever 
you go. One’s umuntu is not restricted to close others. Therefore, I would argue that 
reasonable gate-keeping practices are called for in relation to asylum seekers and 
refugees basic health care needs, if considered from an Ubuntu outlook.                       
 
The discussion of South Africa as a moral arena is concluded with the assertion that 
both the dominant moral paradigms most South Africans seem to hold, place respect 
for each other as humans centrally. Meeting the basic needs of others as a way of 
respecting human flourishing and an expression of doing what is morally right would 
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require just gate-keeping practices. This would be true for all levels of consideration, 
from our constitutional aspirations, institutional policies as well as the personal and 
role-incumbent ethics of those who represent institutions or health professions.      
 
5. Patriotic Bias 
 
Taking stock of my reasoning so far, a morally persuasive case can probably be 
made for gate-keeping. In fact, properly applied, gate-keeping consistently thought-
through and followed-through from legislative to ground level might serve an 
important function in the fair distribution of resources. Furthermore, neither of the two 
major moral frameworks that many South Africans might default to in dealing with 
ethical matters seems to condone closing the gates on someone in need of basic 
health care. This would be to deny the person’s dignity. A human rights perspective 
recognises that every human being, in the moral cosmopolitan sense of the word, is 
entitled to the basic goods to construct a minimally decent life, including basic health 
care. This notion is taken up on a South African constitutional and legislative level 
with an expectation that implementation will follow suit all the way down. Similarly, 
Ubuntu seems to be a moral outlook that deeply recognises the dignity of persons.  
Non-responsiveness to a person in need might be considered a slight on the morality 
of the person who is appealed to for assistance as well as a slight on the dignity of 
the person in need. Furthermore, not attending to health and wellness would most 
likely not be considered in the interest of the collective. Taking such a stance does 
not negate the dilemmas potentially brought about by calls for solidarity and acting in 
the interest of community. Despite the dilemmas, I am inclined to say that an Ubuntu 
outlook has cosmopolitan undertones where it concerns any person in need, 
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including their health care needs. Not acknowledging and trying to respond to a 
person in need seems contrary to striving to become more human oneself.  
  
If this line of reasoning seems plausible, what does one then make of the often 
unfriendly gate-keeping practices concerning refugees and asylum seekers who are 
in need of basic health care? This happens notwithstanding the basic health care 
access afforded by our Constitution and ensuing legislation, a human rights 
framework as well as the precepts of Ubuntu.  
 
Context plays a role here. South Africa is a developing country with limited 
resources.  We have a political history of oppression. Conceivably many citizens 
entered into an era of hope after the first democratic elections in 1994. However, for 
many South Africans their hopes have perhaps not manifested into a significantly 
better resourced everyday life. In addition, thousands of foreign nationals are making 
South Africa their home, placing more pressure on already thinly stretched 
resources. The moral worth of asylum seekers and refugees may not be in question 
and their need to have access to basic health care is morally granted. At the same 
time, South Africans understandably strive to secure a better future for themselves.  
Ethically speaking, how much could they be expected to share with, and sacrifice for, 
foreigners in such pursuit? What could they justifiably do to secure a better future for 
themselves?       
 
One answer might be to act on a perhaps unexpressed, or in some instances, overt 
call for solidarity and identifying with one’s own – ensuring that those to whom one 
has special obligations are secure. Therefore, and despite our Constitution and the 
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current legislation, there may be a sense of justification in closing the gates on 
strangers despite moral ideals indicating a sense of duty towards any human being, 
regardless of nationality or affiliation. Another possibility might be a sense that many 
South Africans paid a heavy price during years of oppression. They were denied 
equality and, as a result, did not have access to adequate schooling, health care, 
housing and opportunities to build a better future for themselves and their children.  
With this in mind, it might be considered unreasonable to expect those who have 
been disadvantaged through oppressive political circumstances to share resources 
with those who were not part of this process of struggle and liberation. Generally 
speaking, South Africans are still healing and perceivably trying to establish 
minimally decent life circumstances. Asylum seekers and refugees might be seen as 
interfering with such a process. It may well be experienced as unfair to be 
disadvantaged again, this time by the claims of others in need who are not 
compatriots in the historical process. An inclination to close the gates on non-South 
African citizens may therefore feel justified.      
 
These pro-patriotic notions are explored in the discussion that follows. The ethics of 
patriotism and, more specifically, patriotic bias are brought into focus. The discussion 
is structured along the following lines: considering what patriotism is, arguing that 
patriotic bias might be morally justifiable, and considering the ethical implications of 
upholding patriotic bias when faced with another human being’s need for basic 
health care. It is concluded that despite morally defensible arguments proposed in 
favour of patriotic bias, meeting the basic human needs of human beings ought to 
take precedence over patriotic sentiments despite contextual considerations.   
 
54 
 
Patriotism is about love for one’s country, and as Eamonn Callan puts it “… 
constancy in love …”109. This kind of ‘love’ seems to be characterised by an 
awareness of time: the history of a country, how it has come to the point it is at 
currently, and an envisaged future of a particular kind. It is about identification, 
association and attachment, and pride110. Alisdair Macintyre says that, should it be 
considered a virtue, “… patriotism is one of a class of loyalty-exhibiting virtues …”111. 
   
South African patriotic sentiments were evident when the Springboks won the Rugby 
World Cup in 1995. This happened about one year after our country’s first 
democratic elections and our president at the time, Mr Nelson Mandela, publically 
congratulated the team captain. Even though rugby may have been perceived as the 
sport of the previous oppressors, the patriotic feeling that many South Africans felt 
on that day was momentous. The death of Mr Nelson Mandela in 2013 is another 
example of patriotic sentiment evoked when a nation faces the loss of a loved, or at 
least widely respected, leader. The event of his death appeared to have evoked 
collective sadness amongst South Africans, despite political tensions evident at the 
time.  
  
However, in addition to these more emotive shows of patriotism is a person’s 
dedication to their country and their dedication to contributing to its flourishing.  
Should one’s country flourish, the chances that it will provide for one’s own needs 
are better112. Understood this way, love for and commitment to one’s country seems 
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possible in response to Stephen Macedo’s question “[h]ow can you have a ‘special 
relationship’ with 70 or 300 million or a billion people?”113. Following on from this, 
“[m]oderate [n]ationalism” places a premium on the interests of one’s own nation114. 
Positively stated from a Kantian view, Pauline Kleingeld points out that recognising 
the moral worth of all humans does not mean that “one has a moral duty or political 
duty to treat every person on the planet the same …”115. This line of thinking might 
be described as a “[c]ompatriots first argument” or “national partiality argument”116 . If 
a choice needs to be made between giving something to a “compatriot” or a “non-
compatriot”, and both their needs cannot be met, one ought to choose one’s 
compatriot117. The moral stance underpinning the compatriots-first view is that 
“[p]utting our nearest and dearest first does not conflict with cosmopolitanism, but in 
any feasible world, most extensively achieves cosmopolitan ends”118. A gate-keeper 
might, therefore, hold the view that to be partial towards nationals and to ensure that 
their needs are met in the first instance, gives everyone a better chance of creating a 
better society.  
 
The views of Will Kymlicka and Christine Streahle are relevant here. They point out 
that, historically, human kind shows this possibly to be true: humans tend to share 
with those who they are partial to. When they do share with others beyond those 
whom they are partial to, in this case asylum seekers and refugees, they need to 
have a sense of “common identity” with them and to feel that the sharing will be 
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“reciprocated” in the future119. Further to reciprocity, moral motivation for patriotism 
might be underpinned by what Igor Primoratz calls “… gratitude, … fairness, and … 
the common good”120. A person might feel grateful for what their country has given 
them to construct a decent life for themselves. Such gratitude may evoke a sense of 
obligation to the country121. They may also perceive the need for fairness – as they 
benefit from what the country offers, so should compatriots. What is available should 
be equitably distributed to citizens and, at the same time, each person should fulfil 
their duty towards compatriots. Such duty and distribution of benefits are seen in the 
light of acting in the common good of compatriots122. Construed this way, Primoratz’ 
statement that “[p]atriotism, then, is love of one’s country, identification with it, and 
special concern for its well-being and that of compatriots”123 seems apt.       
 
However, is such a mind-set morally justifiable? One could argue that it is. It seems 
right that the duties of care brought about by special relationships (such as one’s 
fellow citizens) take priority over responsibilities over those with whom one does not 
share a special relationship. This does not imply that others are considered morally 
less worthy or that others do not have justifiable needs and rights. Such a view is 
proposed by David Axelsen124 for example, who states that “our obligations towards 
compatriots greatly outweigh (and in some cases eclipse) duties towards foreigners” 
and that only being part of the human race is not a strong enough motivation to have 
to share resources. David Miller argues along similar lines - in favour of those 
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belonging to the same nation showing some partiality to their own nationals, even if 
such partiality expresses bias125. It therefore seems reasonable to defend the 
interests of significant others and those with whom one identifies, starting at home – 
family and close others - and following through to fellow countrymen.   
 
To stretch the point, one could say that even if it might be considered morally right 
that everyone is worthy of equal treatment, in the marginal utility sense of the 
word126, it is perhaps too demanding an obligation. One might agree that every child 
is entitled to good basic schooling, but one might not contribute to the schooling of 
other children should this mean that it will interfere with saving up for one’s own 
child’s future education. A parallel example may be where persons abhor 
interpersonal violence and are proponents of pacifism. However, when their children 
are held at knife point and some form of attack from the parents might save them, 
pacifism might be too demanding a requirement for ordinary moral agents. With 
these examples in mind, justification for patriotic bias might be put forward, based on 
the argument that we are morally right in giving precedence to obligations towards 
those we share close/closer associations with. This would be true for those in our 
inner circle as well as our fellow countrymen. This is asserted even though the moral 
worth of every other human being, as well as their right to the basic goods to live a 
minimally decent life, is granted.  
 
Linked to this is the second argument in favour of patriotic bias. The majority of 
South Africans have been disadvantaged by colonialism and the apartheid regime.  
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For many years most South Africans were denied equality with a de-humanising 
effect. After enduring much hardship and trying to deal with the individual and 
collective effect of oppression, South Africans are now considered living in a free 
society with equal voting rights and opportunities. Against this background, it could 
be said that South Africans ought to be afforded the opportunity to establish 
themselves first. The damage and limitations caused by oppression, in a 
redistributive justice sense of the word, need to be acknowledged and respected. 
Within the South African context, such acknowledgement translates, for instance, 
into affirmative action work place policies127 and re-distribution of dispossessed land 
through the land claims process128. Amidst South Africa’s focus on political redress, 
attending to the needs of non-nationals who did not share in South African history, 
struggle and liberation is perceivably not a fair requirement. This line of argument 
resonates with Rachelle Bascara’s129 view. She says the following: 
 
Compatriot partiality can be justified amidst cosmopolitan demands of justice 
if one is from a developing nation, because special consideration towards 
oppressed groups in general is warranted and because an oppressed group’s 
project of self-emancipation is instantiated in the partial compatriot. 
 
Furthermore, the notion of responsibility might be brought in to support the 
argument. David Miller’s description of different kinds of responsibilities is relevant 
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here130. South Africans did not cause the unfavourable circumstances in the 
countries that asylum seekers and refugees are migrating from. South Africans are 
trying to recover from their own oppressive history and cannot be held morally 
responsible for the causes131 of the conflicts in other countries. Even though asylum 
seekers and refugees have painful narratives, they do not share the South African 
experience and are not compatriots. Neither are South Africans responsible for the 
fact that asylum seekers and refugees are migrating, as an “outcome” of their 
situations132. It is not by any doing of South Africans that asylum seekers and 
refugees make their way here to seek a better future. Therefore they could be 
considered uninvited and intruding on territory where historical redress should be 
allowed to take its course without interference. Furthermore, South Africans do not 
seem to gain any kind of “benefit” from the position of the asylum seekers and 
refugees, and in that sense, cannot be looked at for any kind of redress133. When 
South Africans are required to share resources with asylum seekers and refugees 
they might feel exploited as no reciprocity can be expected from a person who flees 
their own country. Seen in this way asylum seekers and refugees lay claim and take 
what belongs to South Africans. Against such a mind-set it might be seen as the duty 
of compatriots, and that it would be virtuous in the patriotic sense134, to exclude 
strangers (asylum seekers and refugees) from access to basic health care services. 
Doing so would be seen to be “restoring justice”135 to those who shared in the 
suffering of oppression. This is not to say that one does not want strangers to have 
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access to basic health care, but just not in the context of current South African 
circumstances, where resources ought to go to nationals. 
 
Considering the above arguments in favour of patriotic bias, what might be 
considered morally justifiable gate-keeping in relation to the claim of asylum seekers 
and refugees to basic health care services? To start, one might argue that our 
Constitution and the legislation that follows therefrom, such as the Refugees Act, are 
idealistic and too permissive. Considering South Africa’s history and the redress that 
needs to happen for South Africans, opening the gates to non-nationals might create 
a gulf between aspirational morality and what could reasonably be asked of moral 
agents. An appeal could therefore be made to bring within reach the moral 
requirements concerning the right of refugees and asylum seekers to basic health 
care based on patriotic bias justifications. Alternatively, our constitutional aspirations 
should perhaps be upheld, but the legislature needs to pay closer heed to the ethical 
dilemmas inherent in the laws that follow from our human rights Constitution.  
Addressing these concerns directly might prevent, at least to some extent, a situation 
where institutions possibly find themselves in a difficult situation concerning human 
rights aspirations and not having the resources to meet them.  
 
Should the legislature take such a stance, institutional directives might be to apply 
discretionary gate-keeping when asylum seekers and refugees require basic health 
care. It would make sense to anticipate the ethical dilemmas facing policy makers 
and those who are in charge of health care services and provide guidance in 
responding to these dilemmas. At the basis of such dilemmas is the perceivable 
tension between wanting to respond to any person in need (who is morally equal to 
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any South African and has a right to health care) and patriotic bias (to preserve 
limited resources for compatriots). With clarity and transparency on an institutional 
level about these ethical dilemmas, health care service providers and the associated 
administrative officials could be expected to provide basic health care services 
primarily to South African citizens. By acknowledging the dilemmas, and supporting 
those who deal with asylum seekers and refugees who seek health care services, 
more restrictive gate-keeping might be practiced in a transparent and respectful 
manner.  
 
Taking a step back and reflecting on the foregoing discussion in favour of patriotic 
bias, one might feel justified, at least partially so, to advocate for restrictive gate-
keeping concerning health care services and non-compatriots. The first argument put 
forward speaks in defence of tipping the scale to caring for those with whom one has 
a special relationship. In this case, the relationship concerns fellow South Africans. 
The second argument highlights that most South Africans have been subjected to 
oppression as a result of colonialism and an unjust political regime. South Africa is a 
young democracy within which citizens are perceivably in a process of trying to 
create minimally decent lives for themselves and where re-distributive processes are 
under way. Resources are limited, including health care, and to expect South 
Africans to share what is available with non-compatriots is too demanding a moral 
requirement. 
 
These points granted, it nonetheless seems that patriotic bias arguments, at a cost 
of meeting the basic needs of others, might only hold in an insulated world. This 
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would apply to a patria with impenetrable symbolic or actual walls136, where one 
could pretend that globalisation and migration, and the effects thereof, do not exist or 
are irrelevant. In such a country, one might find denial or naivety about being part of 
a human community beyond one’s own country. In such a country patriotic bias may 
sit comfortably within moral territory.   
 
However, South Africa is not such a country. Migrants from other African countries, 
in particular, are real and stand in the same queue for basic health care services as 
many South African citizens. Callan’s statement seems relevant in that there is “… 
the ambivalence with which we should regard the moral status of patriotism”137. In 
the negative sense, patriotism is an expression of a nationalist outlook138 and might 
be associated with a dislike of those who are not considered compatriots. It might go 
as far as considering oneself superior to non-compatriots, putting in doubt the notion 
that all human beings are of equal moral value. Intolerance and attempts to prevent 
non-compatriots from integrating into a particular society and sharing in the 
resources belonging to compatriots may consequently be prompted. Pauline 
Kleingeld describes this as a perception of “[p]atriotism as a [d]uty”139. Such a mind-
set is characterised by division between us and others who we need to protect 
ourselves from and an objectification of other human beings as adversaries. Extreme 
gate-keeping doctrines might hold that non-compatriots should not be 
accommodated. It might also be visible in the degrading forms in which asylum 
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seekers and refugees are addressed and treated. In its extreme form “xenophobia 
ethnic hatred” may be directed at non-compatriots140.  
   
Extremist positions aside, it seems that there is some space in the human 
community for partiality and measures of inequality. It does not necessarily cause 
serious moral distress if some people are better off than others, have more 
resources and are able to live their lives with more comforts and opportunities than 
others. The same tolerance appears to hold if we share more of what we have with 
those with whom we have a special connection. In fact, legislation other than the 
Refugees Act places duty of care in the context of close relationships. For instance, 
the Children’s Act 141 requires parents not to behave towards their children in certain 
ways. The duty of parents to care and protect is clear142 – a requirement in the first 
instance contextualised within a special relationship.  
 
It might also be granted that, symbolically speaking, building some sort of wall to 
ensure that those who enter South Africa and seek refuge and a chance to live a 
minimally decent life here, are dealt with according to certain criteria that are fair in 
the light of the collective interest of South Africans. Our Constitution advocates 
respect of all South Africans and the legislature provides a framework for the 
protection of the rights of citizens. With this in mind, I am not suggesting that 
whoever enters South Africa by whatever means and with whatever motives should 
be embraced into South African society.  
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All these considerations taken into account, and herein lies the crux of my moral 
protest about the first patriotic bias justification, it surely cannot be morally justifiable 
to deny the basic needs of any other person in terms of any kind of plausible moral 
framework. Basic health care is a need shared by all persons of all descriptions 
across the globe. This fundamental need exists regardless of where the person 
happens to find themselves at a particular point in time. Applying liberal human rights 
thinking health care would be considered a right. Thinking from an Ubuntu 
perspective, the well-being of another is a matter of dignity and treating others with 
dignity is a moral matter. Therefore, not being responsive to a person’s health care 
needs is to deny another human being dignity and the essential goods to live a 
minimally decent life. Considered from a virtue ethics point of view: what kind of a 
person or society can justifiably stand by and watch men, women and children living 
with the consequences (and dying) because of a refusal of basic health care. Seen 
in its stark reality, it cannot and ought not to matter what nationality a human being is 
when a health care need is expressed. Being human is what matters here, and that 
fact overrides other considerations in this context.    
 
Taken at face value, one might put this reasoning forward to settle the matter and 
dismiss patriotic bias in relation to the essay question. This would be to say that all 
humans are morally equal, nationality is not the deciding factor, and that health care 
is a basic human need and cannot be denied to any human being. Such denial 
would be to renounce a person’s dignity and basic human rights. However, deeper 
probing into the moral dilemma is necessary. If two people stand in line for basic 
health care services and one of them has a special relationship with the health care 
provider, would it be morally wrong of the health care provider to favour the one she 
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is partial to143? The instance of an individual facing this dilemma can be generalised 
to a societal level.    
 
The answer to the question would be yes the health care provider as a 
representative of our national health care system would be morally wrong to favour 
those to whom she is partial. South African society recognises that every person is of 
equal moral worth by virtue of liberal human rights values, Ubuntu principles as well 
as the sentiments of our Constitution. Therefore, practicing inequality in relation to 
basic human needs is not justifiable. Basic human needs are distinguished from 
other needs in that if such needs are not met, fellow human beings are denied the 
basic goods to survive and live minimally decent lives. It cannot, therefore, be 
morally acceptable to say that one person is more eligible for basic health care on 
the basis of their nationality. Perhaps for other things, but not for health care and 
means necessary for human survival and a minimally decent life.  
 
This view is in line with Stephen Nathanson’s deliberation of just partiality and just 
war, in that none of the special relationships that one might have justifies disregard 
of collective human morality144. Miller’s view is relevant here in that where it 
concerns others’ human rights, bias towards nationals does not apply145. In these 
instances, “… the duty to respect the conditions that are universally necessary for 
human beings to lead minimally decent lives …”146 deserve priority. Kai Nielsen 
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similarly talks about the “primary goods” needed by everyone147 regardless of other 
considerations. The right to basic health care corresponds with such a view.   
 
It is therefore concluded that, as far as any basic human needs are concerned, 
considerations in favour of identification with one’s own and solidarity ought to be 
overridden by affording the person in need of basic health care dignity and a chance 
to flourish.   
 
Issue is also taken about the second patriotic bias viewpoint offered and it is rejected 
as a reason to close the gates on refugee and asylum seeker access to basic health 
care services. The essence of the rejection is that, even if I am suffering or 
recovering from suffering and my resources need to be carefully managed, this 
cannot justifiably be the reason to refuse others’ their basic needs and rights.  
Psychologically speaking, one’s own suffering might perhaps serve as a reason to 
limit generosity as one’s resources and energies might be focussed on oneself but 
morally speaking, not justifiably so at the cost of the fundamental needs of any other 
human being.         
 
In advancing this view, the fact that the majority of South Africans were 
disadvantaged by colonialism and apartheid is undisputed. Taking its most 
superficial and generous version it could be said that these systems impeded the 
collaborative development of South Africa. However, I think, truthfully stated, the 
debilitating and brutalising effects of these oppressive systems are starkly evident in 
almost every corner of South Africa. South Africans’ need to recover and build 
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decent lives for themselves is warranted and respected. Neither is our developing 
country status denied, signalling the need to be prudent about the manner in which 
resources are distributed. 
 
Even so, this reality does not justify not giving asylum seekers and refugees access 
to basic health care services in South Africa. Along a parallel track to the 
experiences of the majority of South Africans are the stories of the many asylum 
seekers and refugees who wish to settle in South Africa. Whose needs are, morally 
speaking, more deserving? The question is not loaded with pressure to equalise 
experiences of suffering and desires to overcome oppressive histories. However, a 
reminder that the refugees and asylum seekers from other African countries come 
from oppressive situations is significant. On the whole, these asylum seekers and 
refugees are not medical tourists or simply opportunistic intruders. Furthermore, be 
mindful that African countries supported the cause of South Africa’s oppressed and 
provided aid in different ways during the years of struggle against apartheid148. The 
call to provide for the basic health care needs of asylum seekers and refugees is 
related to similarly oppressed human beings from other developing countries, a 
number of whom supported South Africans to become liberated. Bascara’s argument 
- that developing countries with an oppressive history are entitled to exclusively 
direct their resources to their own are justified in not assisting other countries who 
might also be in need149 - therefore, cannot be used to vindicate closing the health 
care gates on refugees and asylum seekers.  
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Social justice and, more specifically, re-distributive justice principles, are relevant 
here. Re-distributive justice concerns the notion that redress should be made where 
goods and opportunities have been taken from people unfairly150. As mentioned 
earlier, such redress in South African society includes affirmative action and land 
claims. These practices are relevant amongst South Africans, not in relation to 
refugees and asylum seekers. So, to make the point clear, some discriminatory 
practices are legitimised in the South African context to equalise matters. This is to 
ensure that justice is done by South Africans who have been disadvantaged by 
political oppression. However, basic human needs are excluded from this equation. 
Furthermore, redistributive considerations do not involve refugees and asylum 
seekers.     
 
In this light, citizens’ claims to distribute what belongs, and is available, to South 
Africans compatriots might be interpreted as a striving to recover and build a better 
future. Bascara151 speaks to this sentiment when she says that “[i]t is only when the 
oppressed themselves are able to actively exercise their agency that full 
emancipation can be realized”. However, it cannot be morally warranted for South 
African compatriots to close the gates when another human being, who does not 
share in their particular history, has health care needs whilst being on South African 
territory. It cannot be morally just to use nationality and own suffering as a reason to 
not meet the basic needs of another human being. The position that I am stating 
here is that where basic human needs/rights are at stake, they overshadow the need 
to focus on one’s own history of suffering. A patriotic bias argument on the basis of 
                                                          
150
 Adam Swift, “Social Justice”, Political Philosophy: A Beginners’ Guide for Students and Politicians (2
nd
 Edition 
Polity Press: Cambridge 2006): p.33. 
151 Bascara, “Compatriot partiality and cosmopolitan justice: Can we justify compatriot partiality within the 
cosmopolitan framework?”, p.35. 
69 
 
compatriots sharing a painful history and exclusively deserving all that South Africa 
has to offer, does not, therefore, appear morally sufficient.  
 
In concluding this section, patriotic bias arguments that speak to the heart and to 
reason, are noted. The ethical dilemmas concerning partiality to one’s closest and 
responding to others in need are undeniable. Similarly, the need for justice to be 
done to compatriots who have suffered oppression is undisputed. However, patriotic 
bias motivations do not persuasively hold in relation to the basic needs of any human 
being to survive and construct a minimally decent life. There is too much at stake.   
Support for this position can be found in both human rights and Ubuntu morality: 
respecting the dignity of persons and responding to their basic needs are 
fundamental and override patriotic considerations. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Is gate-keeping a morally justifiable practice in South Africa in relation to the right of 
refugees and asylum seekers to health care services? Yvette Mbayo-Ndaya and 
many others leave their home countries somewhere in Africa and seek a better 
future in South Africa. Although it can be guessed that some do so for opportunistic 
reasons, many of the stories told about their circumstances illustrate the dynamic of 
forced migration. Staying in their home countries in all likelihood constitutes risk to 
them. They arrive in South Africa and manage to secure asylum seeker and refugee 
status.  
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In this essay it has been argued that gate-keeping might be an ethically justifiable 
practice. When consciously and intentionally applied, it could be put to work to 
ensure fairness towards those who have standing and may lay claim to certain 
things. With regards to health care services, fairness is called for regarding 
distribution of resources as South Africa is a developing country in a time frame of 
recovery after years of oppression. Health care resources are limited and therefore 
need to be mindfully dispensed. Gate-keeping as a practice provides a framework or 
tool that helps to guide decisions about how to distribute health care resources. This 
would apply to the morally aspirational intentions found in the abstract sphere, to the 
way basic health care services and policies are designed and implemented, through 
to the health care service providers and relevant officials who deal with asylum 
seekers and refugees.    
 
Furthermore, an argument has been put forward that a human rights moral outlook 
campaigns for the meeting of basic health care needs of any human being, including 
asylum seekers and refugees. Our Constitution and the legislation following 
therefrom guide our health care gate-keeping principles. Permissive gate-keeping is 
implied with regards to basic health care, based on the premise that to deny health 
care is to deny a person’s dignity. This applies to all human beings, not only South 
African citizens. Whilst the Constitution and our legislation define legal rights, the 
moral base of respect for human rights is clear.  
 
Whilst a liberal human rights perspective appears to unambiguously support meeting 
the basic health care needs of any person regardless of nationality, it might be less 
obvious from an Ubuntu moral outlook. Tensions and dilemmas concerning respect 
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for human dignity and calls for solidarity and acting in the collective interest are 
perceivable. Who is part of community and should be considered with regards to 
collective interest, especially in a recovering South Africa that is on a developmental 
path with limited resources? Notwithstanding these tensions, it seems that turning a 
blind eye to another’s suffering or fundamental needs would communicate an anti- 
Ubuntu spirit. Doing so would be a slight on the morality and dignity of both the 
person appealed to as well as the one in need.  
 
All considered, the words of Yvette Mbayo-Ndaya ‘… there is no medication for 
foreigners’”152 are reason for moral unease. Perhaps with greater awareness and 
deliberation of gate-keeping ethical dilemmas a way forward might be found that 
respects the human dignity of asylum seekers and refugees. As sung by The Fairest 
and Best in their tribute to refugees “… humanity is staring at you … it could be you 
… there is not excuse to turn away …”153.   
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